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0A Taxonomy of Attacks and a Survey of Defence Mechanisms for
Semantic Social Engineering Attacks
RYAN HEARTFIELD, University of Greenwich
GEORGE LOUKAS, University of Greenwich
Social engineering is used as an umbrella term for a broad spectrum of computer exploitations that employ
a variety of attack vectors and strategies to psychologically manipulate a user. Semantic attacks are the
specific type of social engineering attacks that bypass technical defences by actively manipulating object
characteristics, such as platform or system applications, to deceive rather than directly attack the user.
Commonly observed examples include obfuscated URLs, phishing emails, drive-by downloads, spoofed web-
sites and scareware to name a few. This paper presents a taxonomy of semantic attacks, as well as a survey
of applicable defences. By contrasting the threat landscape and the associated mitigation techniques in a
single comparative matrix, we identify the areas where further research can be particularly beneficial.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In information security, the user is often seen as the “weakest link” [Schneier 2011] be-
cause even the strongest technical protection systems can be bypassed if the attacker
successfully manipulates the user into divulging a password, opening a malicious
email attachment or visiting a compromised website. The term most often used for
this process is Social Engineering, but this does not differentiate attacks that bypass
the security of computer systems from those that can be observed in a non-technical
arena, such as prize-winning letter scams [Cluley 2011] or physically impersonating
an authority figure [SocialEngineer 2013]. To differentiate from these, researchers
have proposed the term Semantic Attack [Schneier 2000; Jordan and Heather 2005;
Thompson 2007]. As semantics is the study of meaning and symbolisation, in the con-
text of social engineering a semantic attack is one that manipulates the user-computer
interface to deceive the user and ultimately breach the computer system’s security. We
propose the following definition:
Semantic Attack. The manipulation of user-computer interfacing with the purpose
to breach a computer system’s information security through user deception.
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Attack Family Exploits
Phishing Email, Website, URL, IM, Forums, SMS IRC
File Masquerading Office Document File, Application File, System File
Application Masquerading Scareware, Ransomware, Rogueware
Web Pop-Up Media Plugin, Error Message, Bogus Questionnaire
Malvertisement Infected Ad, One Click Fraud, Download Button
Social Networking Friend Injection, Fake Video Links, Game Requests
Removable Media USB, Flash/SD, CD/DVD
Wireless Rogue AP, Rogue RFID
Table I: Examples of Semantic Attack Exploits
Semantic attacks have been characterised as a technical enigma for information
technology [Abraham and UnduShobha 2010]. That is because the user-computer in-
terface is at the same time their only boundary and their primary window of oppor-
tunity. The expanse of the problem space and variation of attacks are extreme (from
state-backed Advanced Persistent Threats employing multi-stage/platform attack vec-
tors to script kiddies generating automated phishing emails), obscure (defining what
constitutes a semantic attack through its component structure) and arbitrarily diffi-
cult to detect (as attack vectors primarily address the user rather than the technical
system). They can be technically basic [Jordan and Heather 2005; Dhamija et al.
2006; Drake et al. 2004], highly complex [Huber et al. 2010; Marforio et al. 2011] or
a combination of the two [Heartfield and Loukas 2013; Selvaraj and Gutierrez 2010].
Defence mechanisms have been proposed at scientific research level to target exploita-
tions such as website and phishing attacks [Aburrous et al. 2008; Chou et al. 2004;
Huang et al. 2009; P. Kumaraguru and Nunge 2007; Kumaraguru 2009] as well as at
commercial level [FirstCyberSecurity 2009; Webroot 2013]. However solutions such
as these have not addressed the wider semantic attack problem space, and mitigations
tend to be specific to given exploits; static and disparate. Without the dynamic capabil-
ities observed in other defence systems such as antivirus and firewalls, they are often
overcome by attackers who subtly adjust their approach and render exploit-driven de-
tection mechanisms no longer relevant.
Semantic attacks are typically grouped by type of exploitation into specifically re-
lated attack families. For instance, phishing has become synonymous with fake web-
sites and emails [Dhamija et al. 2006], whereby victims are targeted through a baiting
mechanism [Atkins and Huang 2013]. In this example, the attack family is phishing,
whereas phishing emails and phishing websites assume the exploitation type. Another
example would be fake applications posing as legitimate pieces of software (scareware,
rogueware [Corrons 2010] etc.), which can be associated with the Application Mas-
querading attack family. A majority view of currently observed semantic attacks is
presented in Table I, which combines terminologies commonly used by information se-
curity practitioners to identify semantic attack exploitations into related attack fami-
lies. This static approach fails to identify common attributes of exploitations that are
grouped under different attack families. For example, a phishing URL on a web page
or email may share a similar method of obfuscation/deception with the one used in a
bogus video URL on a social network site (SNS). So, a defence mechanism that would
defeat the particular method would potentially be useful for both types of semantic
attacks.
Attack-specific approaches to classification have historically led to development of
computer security systems that rely on manually generated attack signatures and
definitions [Christodorescu and Jha 2004], which can be circumvented in a number
of ways (e.g. by zero-day vulnerabilities, obfuscation, polymorphism [Bilge and Du-
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mitras 2012] etc.). Through taxonomic research and development, defence systems
have employed techniques that analyse relationships between application behaviour
and response (sandboxing [Blasing et al. 2010; Greamo and A.Ghosh 2011], dynamic
anomaly based scanning [Tavallaee et al. 2010] etc.). These systems have enabled
dynamic and proactive response to security threats on multiple technical platforms,
from mobile to desktop operating systems. Yet, this approach has not been replicated
or realised for semantic attacks.
A taxonomy of the semantic attack problem space can help researchers evaluate the
applicability and scope of proposed solutions for different current and future threats.
Some first steps have already been taken in this direction, but still to a limited extent.
For instance, Foozy et al. [2011] have classified attacks based solely on the primary
attack vector, such as whether it is a website or email, while Ivaturi and Janczewski
[2011] have used a hierarchical classification structure that links specific attack vec-
tors to the conditions of their delivery, specifically person-to-person or via online media.
These approaches cannot identify attacks and their associated behaviour outside of the
criteria specified and therefore may be unable to address future semantic attacks or
ones that combine exploitations from more than one categories.
More recently, Tetri and Vuorinen [2013] introduced a dynamic classification frame-
work that addresses high-level attack behaviours involved in the creation of a semantic
attack: persuasion, fabrication and data gathering. This approach provides a basis for
classifying threats outside of the limited scope of previous taxonomies, but is limited
to high-level theoretical dimensions of Social Engineering and it is not clear how it
can be used at a technical level by developers of semantic attack defence technologies.
On the other hand, the work of Algarni et al. [2013] is highly useful in that respect as
it identifies the entities that comprise an attack irrespective of visual representation,
but their focus is solely on social networking.
2. TAXONOMY OF SEMANTIC ATTACKS
Our aim is to help researchers and engineers develop technical defence approaches
for both current and future semantic attacks by addressing core semantic attack char-
acteristics rather than particular implementations. That is because a defence system
designed for a particular set of characteristics can be applicable across all attack types
that share it, thus making it a more efficient choice from the perspective of technical
development.
Note that current cybercrime operations may have many layers and an adversary
may employ composite semantic attacks consisting of multiple phases of individual
semantic attacks, in parallel or one after the other [Sood and Enbody 2014]. An ex-
ample may be a spam email containing a URL to a spoofed website, where the user is
forwarded to a drive-by download that results in infection with a scareware applica-
tion. Our taxonomy classification is designed to classify semantic attacks as individual
singular components (e.g., the drive-by download) rather than the possible permuta-
tions of these components (spam → spoofed website → drive-by download → scare-
ware). This is an important function of developing a generic taxonomy of attacks that
is practically usable at a technical level because it simplifies the objective of a defence
mechanism. Assuming that a composite attack requires all its individual component
attacks to succeed, mechanisms that address any of the latter would protect against
the composite attack too. In the example above, the threat of the scareware application
delivered in this manner would be thwarted by any technical mechanism that would
effectively block the spam email, spoofed website or drive-by-download attempt.
To be usable in the long-term, these characteristics need to be universally applica-
ble and independent of the platform involved. In particular the platform consolida-
tion driven by cloud computing, the Internet of Things and other recent computing
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paradigms is making the distinction between mobile, desktop and embedded system
user experience less obvious than in the past. For example, in the near future, fake
tyre pressure alerts shown on a car’s dashboard [Rouf et al. 2010] may be used to
achieve deception in a manner not too dissimilar to current scareware pop-up alerts
for mobile and desktop users. A defence approach focusing on the fake warning decep-
tion characteristics rather than the platform targeted would potentially be applicable
for both.
These characteristics also need to span all stages of an attack. For this, we adopt the
definition of the three distinct control stages of orchestration, exploitation and execu-
tion suggested by [CESG 2015]. For each stage we pose the questions that we believe
would matter the most to developers of technical protection mechanisms. In addition,
we have ensured that for each category, the classifications are mutually exclusive.
Based on this constraint we do not by any means claim that the taxonomy is ex-
haustive, but we do evaluate its practical usefulness by providing for each category an
example of how a developer can find it useful.
Control Stage 1: Orchestration
(1) How is the target chosen?
This can help identify the conditions for exposure to an attack. For instance,
whether a user is vulnerable due to a specific attribute of theirs or chosen ran-
domly makes a difference for the user and system features that a defence system
may have to focus on.
(2) How does the attack reach the target?
This may help identify the platforms that are involved in the attack, which in turn
may help a developer choose which remote (hence involving a network) or local
system to monitor and potentially where to place a defence mechanism.
(3) Is the attack automated?
The degree of automation in an attack can change fundamentally the response
mechanism or the type of data that can be meaningful to collect about it. For in-
stance, a fully automated attack may be possible to fingerprint based on patterns
of previously observed behaviour, while a fully manual attack may focus on the
attacker’s behaviour instead.
Control Stage 2: Exploitation
(1) Is it looks or behaviour that deceive the user?
This can potentially help the developer of a defence mechanism to pinpoint mech-
anisms by which an attacker can deceive the user into a false expectation by ma-
nipulating visual and/or system behaviour aspects of a system.
(2) Is the platform used in the deception only (ab)used or also programmatically mod-
ified?
Identifying whether the deception occurs in code (embedded in the system or ex-
ternal), or by abusing intended user space functionality, can help shape the design
of a defence system by narrowing down its scope.
Control Stage 3: Execution
(1) Does the attack complete the deception in one step?
An attack that relies on more than one step can be potentially detected more easily
than a single-step one and before it completes by looking for traces of its initial
steps. It may also be thwarted by preventing even one of the compromising actions
that a user needs to be deceived into committing.
(2) Does the deception persist?
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Contrary to one-off deception attempts, persistent ones may have a high chance of
succeeding in their target but could also help a learning-based defence system to
gradually identify its pattern of behaviour and block it.
Each category of answers that correspond to each question helps establish the sec-
tions and subsections of the taxonomy, as shown in Fig. 1.
Utilising a single-layer attack model for classification, our taxonomy is able to iden-
tify the composition of a semantic attack by using a parameter-based approach, or-
ganising the classification criteria in a linear fashion. Unlike previous taxonomy ap-
proaches, it captures multiple variables involved in the delivery and execution of a
semantic attack by applying criteria that are independent of the attack vectors used.
As a result, it can potentially represent both existing and future attacks.
To supplement the taxonomy with produce survey of the current landscape of defence
mechanisms, as well as a comparative matrix between the classification criteria and
applicable defences, which illustrates areas of semantic attack security most in need
of research.
Fig. 1. Taxonomy of Semantic Attack Mechanisms
2.1. Control Stage 1: Orchestration
The arrangement of targeting, distribution and automation in a semantic attack.
TD: Target Description
This refers to the targeting methodology applied in the attack orchestration process:
whether the attacker has chosen to target an individual or group randomly (promis-
cuous targeting) or based on their identity or some other exclusive attribute of theirs
(explicit targeting).
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TD1: Explicit targeting. By explicit targeting, we refer to the practice of choosing a par-
ticular individual or group of users as the targets of an attack based on their specific
identity or an exclusive attribute of theirs (company, role, location etc...). Typical exam-
ples here are spear-phishing and watering hole. Spear-phishing is the targeted version
of phishing, where a carefully crafted phishing email is directed to a specific individual
or organisation. This is known as whaling when the target is highly valuable (e.g., a
senior executive) [Orman 2009]. Watering hole is the targeted version of the drive-by-
download attack, where a malicious script is implanted on the websites that a partic-
ular individual or community are known to visit [RSA 2012]. In the same category of
explicit targeting based on a common attribute we can include the practice of targeting
victims located in a particular country, so as to intentionally cultivate botnets of better
quality or to exploit that country’s sociopolitical affairs [Chaffin 2014]. For emphasis,
let us clarify that we include here only attacks where the target is chosen explicitly
for their identity or for an exclusive attribute of theirs, not merely as a second order of
consequence. For example, a WiFi phishing attack in a coffee shop is generally not a
targeted attack (see TD2: promiscuous targeting). The fact that people that are coffee
drinkers are targeted is only a second order of consequence, as the attacker is highly
unlikely to have explicitly chosen them because they are coffee drinkers. However, one
could conceive a targeted instance of this attack (say a ”WiFi spear-phishing” attack)
launched specifically when a particular target individual is known to visit that coffee
shop. This hypothetical attack would indeed be classified as explicitly targeted.
TD2: Promiscuous targeting. Promiscuous targeting is nondescript and typically focuses
on maximum exposure. A typical example would be a large-scale phishing campaign
launched by a botnet against any email address the attacker could find [Banday et al.
2009]. Semantic attack worms employing instant messaging and file-sharing usually
also aim for maximum exposure through promiscuous targeting [Sharma 2011]. Wifi
phishing attacks [Hwang et al. 2008; Briones et al. 2013] are generally promiscuous
in their user targeting. The attacker sets up a malicious access point to exploit any
incoming client connection regardless of user identity or any other attribute.
MD: Method of Distribution
This refers to the mechanism by which an attack arrives at the target system: through
a software interface (Software), executed on the target host (Software-Local) or on a
distributed host environment (Software-Remote); or whether it is a physical device
(Hardware) that interfaces with the target host via direct hardware access (Hardware
without software interaction) or via the host operating system (Hardware with soft-
ware interaction). Software interfaces are generally more common. Software-based at-
tacks can be highly automated and easy to reuse and replicate with minimal super-
vision, while embedding a hardware device in a target environment can be manually
intensive, high-risk, and difficult to target large number of users.
MD1: Software. This refers to semantic attacks that distribute a deception mechanism
through a software medium, usually exploiting built-in functionality in the user inter-
face of legitimate applications rather than technical flaws. They can be classified as
local or remote.
MD1-L: Local. Local software attacks are distributed from within the target user’s
local operating system, as exemplified by attacks that use Trojan horse logic [Emm
2005]. While a Trojan horse carrying a semantic attack payload may itself have been
distributed remotely (e.g., unknowingly downloaded from a website), the semantic at-
tack already resides within the target machine when presented to its target [Corrons
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2010]. This behaviour is commonly observed in PDF file masquerading [Bindra 2011]
and in scareware/rogueware attacks [Hwang et al. 2008; Corrons 2010].
MD1-R: Remote. Here, the semantic attack originates from a host environment other
than the target user’s system. It may involve web servers or distributed applications,
such as cloud (for storage, server hosting or email) and peer-to-peer platforms (P2P
networks, instant messaging, torrents). Remote distribution varies between different
components in a remote platform. For example, a malicious URL may be presented via
an email system on the Internet [Drake et al. 2004] or an instant messaging program
[Leavitt 2005; Lauinger et al. 2010]. Malicious files can be served via synchronised
cloud storage [Heartfield and Loukas 2013], malvertisements embedded in compro-
mised web pages [Li et al. 2012], automated bots in social network sites [Boshmaf
et al. 2011; Coburn and Marra 2008] or a stolen online gaming avatar used to gather
information on a computer gaming system [Podhradsky et al. 2013].
MD2: Hardware without software interaction. This refers to attacks distributed to the tar-
get through a local hardware interface without interacting with the target host’s oper-
ating system. Examples include hardware interfaces capable of direct memory access
(DMA) or external hardware devices that passively intercept user data. In the case
of DMA exploits, attackers plant common peripherals, such as storage devices, em-
ploying only hardware interfaces that are capable of creating a direct channel to a
system’s physical memory, such as firewire [Boileau 2006] or a PCI network interface
card [Duflot et al. 2011]. Attackers can also plant man-in-the-middle sniffing devices
in the guise of Ethernet network outlet points, or hardware key loggers embedded in
keyboards [Keelog 2015].
MD3: Hardware with software interaction. Most hardware-distributed semantic attacks
rely on a software component in order to elicit compromising user actions. For ex-
ample, Anderson and Anderson [2010] describe a series of attacks involving the USB
interface, presented as a masqueraded hardware device that includes a software com-
ponent, such as a malicious file triggering the autorun functionality. In the same cat-
egory we can include exploitations that depend on WiFi, Bluetooth, as well as other
less obvious interfaces for their distribution. An interesting example is near field com-
munication (NFC) phishing. When attached to a legitimate surface (say a Red Cross
donation appeal poster), a maliciously modified NFC tag interacts with the NFC soft-
ware on users’ smartphones and directs them to a malicious website rather than the
Red Cross’s. [Madlmayr et al. 2008].
MA: Mode of Automation
Mode of automation refers to the degree of attacker supervision in the activation and
administration of a semantic attack: by manually supervising every element of the
attack throughout its lifetime (Manual), pre-configuring every aspect and having no
control over the attack after it is launched (Automatic) or by pre-configuring every
aspect of it, yet being able to manually adjust it after initiating it through some form
of live command and control (Semi-Automatic).
MA1: Manual. This requires intervention from the attacker to facilitate delivery of a
semantic attack. The attacker explicitly triggers the deception mechanism by man-
ually placing it in the target environment and, where applicable, explicitly responds
to events when user interaction occurs. The attack procedure is flexible, because the
attacker has full control over the process and may modify it during the attack. Ex-
amples could include an attacker manually sending a phishing email from a spoofed
email account rather than an automated botnet, handing out infected DVDs outside a
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building, or physically intercepting legitimate media devices and embedding into them
a malicious payload before they reach their target [Fisher 2015].
MA2: Automatic. Here, the semantic attack is delivered in an automated manner with-
out requiring communication or intervention from the attacker. The attacker has pre-
programmed the procedure for delivering the attack. Automatic mode of automation
provides obfuscation of the attacker as the semantic attack operates without exter-
nal influence, but also limits control and flexibility. For example, in the case of the
Anna Kournikova worm, the malicious email and file attachment contained the com-
plete set of instructions for the attack [Chen 2003]; once released the author had no
control over its targeting or attack parameters. A more recent example is “Selfmite”,
a SMS malware for Android devices, which contains a hard-coded procedure to send
text messages containing a link to an app. Once installed once, it then replicates the
message to the first 20 contacts on that device, effectively masquerading as a text from
a known associate in an automated fashion [Ducklin 2014b]. In the same category we
can include drive-by download attacks. Once an attacker embeds malicious code in a
vulnerable website, the drive-by download runs automatically when a user visits the
website [Mavromatis and Monrose 2008; Provos et al. 2009]. In general, full automa-
tion can help hide the origin of a semantic attack and reduce the effort required to
replicate it, but also limits control over the process. Most automatic semantic attacks
feature crude deception mechanisms that can be noticed by an experienced user.
2.2. Control Stage 2: Exploitation
The construction and application of attack vectors designed to bypass system informa-
tion security.
DV: Deception Vector
The deception vector is a focal point of this taxonomy. It defines the mechanism by
which the user is deceived into facilitating a security breach, and can be categorised
as cosmetic, behaviour-based or a combination of the two.
DV1: Cosmetic. In the use of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), there is an implicit
trust between GUI designer and user. The GUI designer trusts that the GUI will be
used as intended, and the user trusts that each component is what it appears to be.
Cosmetic semantic attacks exploit this trust by manipulating the appearance of GUI
components. For example, a file contains a name, type extension, icon and associated
program. Filenames typically appear as readable, clear indicators of what a file does
or contains, as is often required by the author. Therefore, official-looking and recognis-
able filenames command a level of trust. The attacks in [Johnson et al. 2008] and [Shin
et al. 2006] are prime examples where cosmetic deception techniques have proven par-
ticularly effective in P2P applications, either by matching filenames in a user’s shared
folder or by generating commonly searched filenames on the network. File extensions
carry a presupposed risk associated to their behaviour. For example, “.exe” is a well
known executable extension and thus threat to the user’s system if the file is mali-
cious. However, the same caution is not exercised for other executable types, such as
“.bat”, “.ini”, “.lnk”, or “.scr” [Heartfield and Loukas 2013]. Moreoever, in Microsoft
Windows, the file type and appropriate icon to be displayed are determined by exten-
sion. As Windows Explorer hides extensions by default and executable programs can
be configured to display any icon [Yee 2005], users can be deceived by an icon - ex-
tension mismatch if the filename is disguised, as in “document.txt.exe” displayed as
“document.txt”. In the same manner, emails contain sender addresses, subject titles,
body of text containing images and attachments [Drake et al. 2004], and websites use
a domain name URL and common page features, such as buttons and images, which
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can be manipulated to deceive a user. Attackers can generate phishing websites that
assume the identity of their legitimate counterparts by copying the source code and
images to appear completely identical [Dhamija et al. 2006]. In typosquatting attacks,
simple but effective cosmetic deception is achieved by registering domain names that
are similar to popular, legitimate websites, and are likely to be visited by users making
spelling mistakes (e.g. twiter.com or facebok.com) [Agten et al. 2015].
Cosmetic deception is prevalent in attacks against web-based user interfaces, such
as social media platforms where an attacker posts malicious links that visually imitate
videos, enticing users to click on them to view the content [TrendMicro 2014]. In WiFi
phishing, the attacker redirects users to an authentication website that looks like the
login page for free Internet service [Song et al. 2010]. The GUI components expected
for such a page are included to add integrity and conformity to the exploit. Felt and
Wagner [2011] provide examples of techniques for developing fake mobile apps that
appear like their legitimate counterparts, by duplicating login screen, including the
logo, GUI layout and text. The study carried out by J.Corbetta et al. [2014] has demon-
strated visual logo spoofing, with manipulated “seal images”, which fool the users but
are otherwise seen as non-malicious content to a security system monitoring the web
platform.
DV2: Behaviour. Here, deception is achieved by mimicking a legitimate system’s be-
haviour rather than looks. Users are duped by supposed functionality convention
against the standard approach used in well-known implementations. For example, in
the generic rogue access point attack, the user is deceived by merely seeing it on the
list of available WiFi networks [Hwang et al. 2008]. Also, in URL phishing attacks
on social network sites [Leavitt 2005; N. Wang and Grossklags 2011], the deception
relies solely on the accepted behaviour associated to the origin of the attack, as it is
received from a user that is on the target’s list of friends. In reality, the message is
automatically generated by a malicious app installed on that friend’s account.
DV3: Hybrid. Hybrid approaches combine aspects of both “looking like” (DV1) and “be-
having like” (DV2) to create a convincing deception, as exemplified by phishing web-
sites, which typically copy not only images and text, but also the actual code from the
legitimate website [Dhamija et al. 2006]. Corrons [2010] and Giles [2010] describe how
scareware applications masquerade as antivirus programs by using similar logos, text
and interfaces as their legitimate counterparts, complete with scanning engines and
infection removal tools. Paganini [2014] has reported an attack where a wrapper was
attached to a legitimate mobile banking app. Once installed, it would load an in-app
HTML page mimicking both the looks and the behaviour of the legitimate application’s
login form. On entering user credentials, an error would be displayed, requesting the
user to install the application again. At that point, the legitimate version would indeed
be installed and would function as expected from then on.
Other examples of hybrid deception can be seen in removable media attacks, such
as USB flash drives. A USB storage device can be preloaded with a legitimate looking
Microsoft word file that actually contains a malicious Visual Basic macro or zero-day
exploit. Once the user has clicked on the file, Microsoft word opens as the user would
expect, whilst also running the malicious code attached to the word document. A recent
demonstration by Nohl and Lehl [2014] has shown how USB firmware controllers can
be reprogrammed to spoof other devices to take control of a system, exfiltrate data
or spy on the user. The exploit shows how a USB flash drive can assume different or
multiple identities on a computer, such as a webcam, keyboard, as well as a USB flash
drive, by manipulating USB interface identifiers used by operating system to interact
with the USB devices functionality (e.g., processing key states sent by a USB keyboard
peripheral). Here, the deception vector is both cosmetic and behavioural. The USB
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device appears and functions as the user would expect, but in addition it deceives the
host system into thinking it is a different device and allows the execution of arbitrary
code.
IM: Interface Manipulation
A deception vector can be exploited by only utilising maliciously the existing func-
tionality of the target system (user interface) or by also programmatically modifying
it (programmatic interface). For example, an attacker may direct users to an attack
server by merely posting a hyperlink using a social network site’s user interface or by
programmatically injecting malicious javascript code into its HTML code.
IM1: User Interface. Here, we refer to attacks that are limited to abusing existing func-
tionality provided by a user interface as the means of deceiving a user. This includes
both hardware and, more commonly, software user interfaces. In malvertisement ex-
ploitations [Li et al. 2012], attackers (ab)use the user functionality of an advertisement
system on a website, by first posting a legitimate advertisement and then replacing it
with a malicious version once it has gained popularity/trust on the host platform. In
search-engine poisoning, attackers repeatedly place unrelated phrases in the body of
text or URLs on a website, which when crawled by a search engine, return the attack-
ers website in the results of a user search [Sullivan 2008; Howard and Komili 2010]. In
man-in-the-middle rogue access points, the attacker adjusts the user configurable ser-
vice set identifier (SSID) to match that of a legitimate access point in the environment
in which it has been installed [Hwang et al. 2008].
IM2: Programmatic Interface. Here, we refer to attacks that are not limited to utilising
existing functionality, but may also modify it, typically by exploiting vulnerabilities on
the target system. This is prevalent in drive-by download attacks where the attacker
injects malicious scripts (e.g. Javascript) into vulnerable websites to redirect users to
a malicious download/installation [Egele et al. 2008; Cova et al. 2010].
A technique detailed by [Krishna 2011] involves compressing into a zip file an ex-
ecutable with special hexadecimal characters in the filename, so as to make it look
like a Microsoft Word document when accessed with a particular popular zip archive
viewer that has this technical flaw. Another example has been presented in [Selvaraj
and Gutierrez 2010] and [Bindra 2011], where the PDF language is manipulated to
create a file that appears and behaves as a legitimate PDF file would, but when ex-
ecuted can launch a semantic attack requesting login credentials and redirecting the
user to a malicious website. This is achieved by using certain special functions in the
PDF language that once compiled run on file execution.
2.3. Control Stage 3: Execution
Operational procedure during attack run-time
AP: Attack Persistence
Different semantic attacks implement varied levels of deception that are one-off or
persist depending on the intentions of the attacker.
AP1: One-off. Here, once the user has triggered the attack payload, e.g. by performing
an action that either grants access privileges or provides sensitive user data to the
attacker, the SA ceases any further action. Large-scale spamming is typical of this ap-
proach. Attackers mass mail a large address set aiming to capture user details through
a spoofed website, which once gathered it redirects users to the legitimate site and dis-
appear [Drake et al. 2004; Dhinakaran et al. 2009]. Similarly, a drive-by-download
attack completes on the download of the malware when the user accesses the infected
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website. The user remains vulnerable to the same infected website on further attempts
to access it, but each time the drive-by-download attack completes on download.
AP2: Continual. In continual semantic attacks, a particular attack instance does not
expire upon successful exploitation and the user continues to be exposed to its decep-
tion attempts. This may involve reoccurring and direct communication with the target
by exploiting the messaging mechanisms provided by email, instant messaging, SNS,
P2P networks, IRC forums and other Internet-based services [Drake et al. 2004; Leav-
itt 2005; Shin et al. 2006]. A characteristic example would be scareware applications,
which periodically display fake malware alerts for as long as they reside on the system
[Giles 2010]. Continual behaviour is common in semantic attacks that are designed to
elicit financial gain from a target.
ES: Execution Steps
A single semantic attack may consist of one or more distinct steps.
ES1: Single-step. Single-step attacks require that the target user carries out only one
action to facilitate exploitation (e.g. open a file, run a program, click on a web link or
button). Once the initial action from the victim has been carried out, the attack payload
is able to gain the necessary information or control for the attacker, at which stage the
semantic attack is complete. Variations of the phishing attacks described in [Drake
et al. 2004] rely on a single step. The less user interaction required the lower the risk
of being detected. This is one of the reasons that can be attributed to the rise of drive-
by malware, where the user’s system is infected with a single click [Cova et al. 2010].
Other examples of single-step attacks can be identified in typical website and email-
based phishing attacks [Dhamija et al. 2006], and more recently in malvertisements
[Li et al. 2012]. In the latter, the attackers place legitimate advertisements on trusted
websites for as long as needed to gain good reputation and be trusted themselves. At
that point, the attackers start placing advertisements that carry malware and infect
all users visiting websites that display them.
ES2: Multi-step. In a multi-step attack, a user needs to be deceived more than once for
the attack to achieve a meaningful result. Attacks involving multiple steps within the
exploitation generally employ one step to gain access and an additional one to steal
information or deliver malware. For example, in WiFi phishing, where the attacker
generates a spoofed SSID of the local WiFi provider (e.g. a coffee shop’s or hotel’s), the
user need to first connect to this rogue access point (step 1), and then to provide his/her
login credentials to the attacker (step 2) after he/she is redirected to a phishing login
page for access to the Internet [Song et al. 2010]. Similarly, in the usual typosquatting
attack [Szurdi et al. 2014; Agten et al. 2015], the user must first navigate to the spoofed
webpage with the mistyped domain name (step 1), and then click on a malformed
download link (step 2). In [Jagatic et al. 2007], the phishing attack contains three
separate steps for data gathering, payload distribution and deception.
Most semantic attacks that exhibit continual attack persistence (AP2) are multi-
step. For instance, scareware [Giles 2010] typically infect the target system via decep-
tion (step 1) and then periodically attempt further deceptions through fake alerts of
malware detected in the system (a repetitive step 2).
2.4. Taxonomy Examples
Here, let us illustrate the use of the taxonomy with four detailed examples and a table
summarising 30 different attacks that have been observed in the wild.
In a drive-by download attack (Figure 2), an attacker needs to first assess a website
for vulnerabilities that can be exploited to embed malicious behaviour. Once a weak-
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ness is found, the attacker proceeds to insert malicious code into the website that will
redirect a user into downloading malware. Attack automation is automatic (MA2) be-
cause it requires no intervention from the attacker after the malicious code has been
embedded in the vulnerable website weaknesses. The software distribution is remotely
presented to the user, on user navigation, via the infected website (MD1-R). Targeting
is promiscuous (TD2) as the attacker has planted the exploitation to attack any user
who visits the website (but there is also a targeted - TD1 - version of this attack: wa-
tering hole). The deception vector can be classified as hybrid because the website itself
is legitimate and thus appears and behaves as expected (DV3). The attacker has pro-
grammatically manipulated the application platform (IM2) to embed the attack pay-
load. The attack requires only one step of deception, which is that the user performs an
action, such as clicking on a button, for the exploitation to occur (ES1). After this, the
attack completes (AP1), but, of course, the user can be infected again by performing
the same action again.
Fig. 2. Taxonomic classification of Drive-By Download
The usual implementation of WiFi Evil Twin phishing (Figure 3) requires two steps
of deception (ES2). The attacker configures a rogue access point to advertise an SSID
that is identical to a legitimate access point’s in the target environment, such as a
coffee shop or shopping centre etc., and also programmatically introduces a spoofed
captive portal (IM2), which is automatically presented (MA2) to any user who connects
to the Internet through it. The rogue access point both looks (identical SSID) and be-
haves in a manner that mimics the legitimate one (DV3). The rogue access point is dis-
tributed via a wireless hardware interface waiting for users to connect to the spoofed
SSID. As software interaction is necessary to connect to the wireless network, this
is classified as MD3. In the attack’s usual implementation, targeting is promiscuous
(TD2), directed to any user within range. The deception persists at least for as long as
the user is connected (AP2).
Malvertisements in social media (Figure 4) are embedded by attackers after having
previously posted a legitimate advertisement that gained in popularity, through user
click volumes. Once that advertisement has gained enough reputation, the attacker
replaces it with a malicious one, which automatically redirects users to an attack web-
site (MA2). The attack targeting is usually promiscuous (TD2). Attack distribution
occurs via the social media website and is forwarded automatically across user com-
munities through in-built recommender and reputation processes on the social media
site (MD1-R). The malvertisement deception vector uses cosmetic obfuscation through
the social media system own carrier browsing system, which creates the appearance of
its legitimacy as an advertisement by placing it in the advertisement pane, displaying
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Fig. 3. Taxonomic classification of WiFi Evil Twin Phishing
Fig. 4. Taxonomic classification of SNS Malvertisement
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Fig. 5. Taxonomic classification of Fake Mobile App
a graphic and applying recommendation labeling to users (DV1, IM1). The attack per-
sistence is continual (AP2), as after it deceives a user once (ES1), the malvertisement
continues appearing in the advertisement sections of their social media profile.
In fake mobile applications (Figure 5), the attacker uploads a spoofed app that mas-
querades as a legitimate program in a mobile software marketplace (e.g. Google Play,
Android, Windows Store, Apple AppStore etc.). The first step is to deceive a user who
has searched for related keywords to download it. The second step is to deceive the user
into accepting the request for granting excessive system privileges (ES2). Typically, at-
tackers spoof popular types of applications with the purpose of gaining maximum ex-
posure (TD2) before the app is identified as malware and removed. Depending on the
implementation, deception can be based on looks, behaviour or both. In the example
of Figure 5, a flashlight app downloaded from an app market features non-standard
GUI and poor graphics, yet the user may still consider it legitimate if it operates the
camera flash as expected (DV2), while in reality, it may be a Trojan horse stealing the
user’s private data in the background. The whole process is automated (MA2), and at-
tack persistence is continual because the application resides permanently in operation
on the mobile device until removed (AP2). The delivery of the deception requires pro-
grammatic manipulation (IM2) and distribution from the remote app server (MD1-R).
Having followed a similar analysis for a broad range of semantic attacks that have
been discovered or are emerging, we have compiled Table II to summarise semantic
attacks based on our taxonomy and observe common characteristics.
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Typical Semantic Attacks in the wild Orch. Exp. Exe.
Bluetooth Phishing (Snarfing Attack): This is targeted at any users that leave their
mobile devices open to accepting Bluetooth transfer as a default setting. The attacker
sends to the target device a malware file with a filename that looks like it corresponds
to a popular application (e.g. twitter, facebook, a banking app etc.). When opened by the
user, it starts exfiltrating data back to the attacker system [Abu-Nimeh and Nair ; Laurie
and Laurie 2003].
MA1,
TD2,
MD3
DV1,
IM1
AP1,
ES1
Cryptovirus/Cryptotrojan/Cryptoworm: An attacker spreads a malicious application
through email, infected programs (using a wrapper approach) and compromised web-
sites. If the user is deceived into allowing the application to infect the user’s machine
(e.g., by opening the email attachment), it starts encrypting user data, such as files or
the hard drive itself. At that point, it attempts a second deception, demanding payment
from the user to release the private key that decrypts the data typically assuming the
appearance of an official-looking letter from a government agency [Symantec 2014].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-L
DV1,
IM2
AP2,
ES1
Drive-By Download: An attacker exploits vulnerabilities in a website’s code structure
(typically JavaScript) and proceeds to embed a malicious payload. The attacker then
sends a link to this website, typically containing the website and full URL path to the
exploited code, to potential targets (e.g. via phishing email, social media post etc). The
machines of the users are infected when they open the link to the website [Mavromatis
and Monrose 2008; Provos et al. 2009; Egele et al. 2008; Cova et al. 2010]. The deception
takes advantage of the normal-looking cosmetics and behaviour of the affected website.
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV3,
IM2
AP1,
ES1
Fake Mobile App: The attacker uploads a spoofed app that masquerades as a legitimate
program in a mobile software marketplace. Upon installation, the application requests
full user or admin/root access to the device, such as access to volatile/non volatile memory,
sending texts, making calls, or downloading other software. When the fake application
runs, it typically exhibits no related functionality to the spoofed legitimate counterpart
[Felt and Wagner 2011] (see Figure 5).
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV2,
IM2
AP2,
ES2
Forum phishing - manual: An attacker manually posts a message within a conversa-
tion thread on a web forum. This can consist of multiple messages posted in the context
of the thread, with some being legitimate but others containing malicious links or im-
ages. Typically, the attacker must bypass CAPTCHA controls by manually entering a
verification code designed to prevent web bots posting messages.
MA1,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV2,
IM1
AP1,
ES1
HTTPS Man-in-the-Middle Adware: An attacker intercepts a user’s HTTPS requests
and places a spoofed certificate within the root certificate store on the user’s system. As
a result, when a user send a HTTPS request the attacker redirects them to a phish-
ing website that is incorrectly identified as legitimate through the spoofed certificate. A
vulnerability facilitating this attack has recently been discovered to have been inadver-
tently introduced to Lenovo laptops through poorly written adware [Callegati et al. 2009;
US-CERT 2015].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-L
DV3,
IM2
AP2,
ES1
Instant Message phishing - automated: Similar to email phishing, instant messaging
phishing includes obfuscated malicious URLs or attachments. The URL redirects the
user to a malicious website and the attachment typically infects the instant messaging
application or installs malware on the user’s machine. In the case of the former, the
attack configures the user’s instant messaging account to resend the phishing messaging
containing the attachment or URL to the user’s contact list [Mannan and van Oorschot
2005; Leavitt 2005].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV2,
IM1
AP1,
ES1
Malicious web pop-up: A malicious pop-up is generated through a browser or website
application window that activates on user action, such as navigation, clicking or hov-
ering over buttons, pictures and URLs. The window content typically takes on various
approaches to deceive users, such as suggesting that they have won an online lottery and
need to enter their bank details to collect the prize, or displaying a fake antivirus scan
that identifies bogus infections on the user machine and advises download of a file to
remove the infection [Abraham and UnduShobha 2010].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV1,
IM2
AP1,
ES1
Malvertisement: Malvertisements are embedded by attackers after initially posting a
legitimate advertisement that gains in popularity on a website. Once the legitimate ad-
vertisement has gained popularity and is trusted by the hosting website, the attacker
replaces the advertisement with a malicious one. Once clicked, a user is redirected to
a drive-by-download or bogus questionnaire. The malvertisement is distributed through
the legitimate advertisement system on the website without needing to programmati-
cally manipulate it [Li et al. 2012].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV1,
IM1
AP2,
ES1
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Multimedia Masquerading: In multimedia masquerading, an attacker embeds a ma-
licious link in the form of a video or audio player, often displaying the video’s first frame
and title to strengthen the deception. Once clicked, the fake media redirects the user
into installing a software application to play the purported media content or to a website
requiring the user to input sensitive data, join a premium subscription service or com-
plete a /questionnaire. Often the attack will propagate through social media platforms
where the user, on completing a plugin installation to run the media content, gives the
malicious adware permissions to re-post on the user’s behalf. The fake media is then
propagated to friends [Ford et al. 2009].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV1,
IM2
AP1,
ES1
NFC Phishing: In NFC attacks, the exploitation is embedded in a modified NFC tag. If
the user is deceived into scanning it, the user is presented with a request to download an
application, which is malicious. The deception relies on the fact that NFC is a relatively
new technology, which does not have a reputation of being used maliciously and the
interface generally resides in a publicly accessible place governed by a trusted hosting
authority, such as airports, shopping centres and schools [Madlmayr et al. 2008].
MA2,
TD2,
MD3
DV3,
IM2
AP1,
ES2
P2P Malware: A very simple attack, whereby the attacker shares malicious files over
a P2P application, giving them commonly searched file names. A user downloads the
malware matching their search criteria and infects their machine by opening the file.
Obfuscation is achieved by manipulation of filename, extension and possibly the icon
displayed by the proprietary browsing system of the P2P application. Replication occurs
by the malware sharing itself through the user’s P2P application [Johnson et al. 2008;
Kalafut et al. 2006].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV1,
IM1
AP1,
ES1
PDF File Masquerading: A Portable document format file is manipulated by using spe-
cial functions in the PDF language that when compiled execute malicious functions, such
as requesting access rights and login credentials or redirecting users to an attack web-
site. The appearance and handling behaviour, as represented by the operating system,
appear legitimate [Selvaraj and Gutierrez 2010; Bindra 2011].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-L
DV3,
IM2
AP1,
ES1
Peripheral Masquerading - USB: In USB masquerading, an attacker configures a
USB compatible device, such as a flash drive, mouse or keyboard, to contain a malicious
payload that executes on insertion in a computer system. Typically, this is achieved using
the autorun features in the operating system, but zero-day attacks have also exploited
vulnerabilities in the way an operating system handles files on USB devices. Importantly,
the malicious peripheral functions as intended, so as to avoid raising suspicions while
infecting the target system in the background [Jacobs 2011]. In its usual implementation,
this is a highly targeted attack (TD1), but a supply chain non-targeted attack (TD2) is
also conceivable).
MA1,
TD1,
MD3
DV3,
IM2
AP2,
ES2
Peripheral Masquerading - Firewire: A hardware deception attack where the decep-
tion mechanism is presented as a physical peripheral utilising the firewire interface. This
can be in the form of a memory stick or external media reader. Once the user physically
connects the hardware device via the firewire interface to the target host, the malware in
the device exploits firewire’s direct memory access capability to steal user data or inject
malicious data into the system [Boileau 2006].
MA1,
TD1,
MD2
DV3,
IM2
AP2,
ES1
Phishing Website: An attacker spoofs a legitimate website for the purposes of stealing
user information or duping them into installing malware, usually by duplicating both
appearance and behaviour.
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV3,
IM2
AP1,
ES1
Ransomware: Ransomware is malware, similar to cryptovirus (without encrypting
files), typically delivered through a Trojan horse, that blocks access to a system by taking
control of a browser of the operating system itself until the user pays a sum of money to
unblock the machine. The ransomware attempts to convince victims that they are the
subject of a criminal inquiry, from a law enforcement authority (using official looking
logos and pictures), for ownership of illegal software or pornography. The user is then
advised how to unblock the computer by following instructions for paying a fine electron-
ically [Gazet 2010]. The attack is continual for as long as it takes the user to pay the
money demanded by the software, after which the access restrictions are lifted.
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-L
DV1,
IM2
AP2,
ES2
Rogueware: Similar to a scareware application, rogueware is a standalone application,
downloaded from a malicious website or as a wrapper/adware alongside a legitimate file.
It masquerades as a well-known program, (such as a media player or Internet connection
optimiser, which when executed attempts to steal the user’s confidential data [Corrons
2010]. The rogueware continually deceives the user by running as a application on the
user host system until removed, whilst
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-L
DV3,
IM2
AP2,
ES2
Rogue Access Point: An attacker installs a wireless network access point in public or
private environment. Its aim is to harvest connecting users and perform man-in-the-
middle attacks through network data sniffing [Hwang et al. 2008].
MA1,
TD2,
MD3
DV2,
IM1
AP2,
ES1
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Scareware:Amalicious computer program designed to convince a user that their system
is infected with malware, pressuring the user into buying and downloading further (fake)
antivirus applications (which are typically malware, spyware, adware etc.). Commonly,
the protection software periodically displays wwarnings for infections and demands pay-
ment for licensing in order to remove them.
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-L
DV3,
IM2
AP2,
ES2
Search Engine Poisoning (Spamdexing): In search engine poisoning, a search en-
gine is manipulated, so as to include a malicious website among the top-ranked re-
sults for given search terms. The users trust that since it appears high on the list of a
trusted search engine, that website must be popular and very relevant to their keyword
search, hence not suspicious. However, the attacker can force search engines to associate
keywords with websites (that are malicious) in several ways, such as flooding websites
that accept simple user generation content with specially crafted URLs [Sullivan 2008;
Howard and Komili 2010].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV2,
IM1
AP1,
ES1
SMS Worm (Selfmite): In the ”Selfmite” SMS worm an attacker configures a text mes-
sage to contain a web link to a recommended app that once downloaded by a user pro-
ceeds to send the same text, including the obfuscated link, to the first 20 contacts in the
user’s phonebook; thus spreading effectively by originating from a trusted source [Duck-
lin 2014a].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-L
DV1,
IM2
AP1,
ES2
Spam Phishing Email (Botnet-generated): An email with a spoofed sender address
and an enticing subject title and message requesting the user to download an attachment
(which contains malware) or click on a malformed URL. Large-scale phishing attacks are
typically distributed via botnets, which crawl the Internet for email addresses and are
configured by botmasters to send template-based emails with varied malicious content.
The attacker uses official-sounding language and logos to create a cosmetically appealing
and authentic communication. Occasionally, spam phishing emails contain payloads for
compromising the user’s system and adding it to the botnet [Drake et al. 2004; Hong
2012].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV1,
IM1
AP1,
ES1
Spear-phishing Email: Identical in format to a spam phishing email, however highly
targeted toward a specific user, organisation or demographic, whereby the email sub-
ject, body of text and sender address are designed to take advantage of an existing re-
lationship with the target. For example, the sender address may appear to originate
from a friend and there may be an attachment appearing to be a photo they would be
likely to receive from that friend. Spear-phishing is typically a manual process, as the at-
tacker needs to be meticulous in the email construction to create a communication that
is highly-specific to the intended target [Hong 2012].
MA1,
TD1,
MD1-R
DV1,
IM1
AP1,
ES1
Spear-phishing Email - APT: This is an advanced form of spear-phishing employed by
advanced persistent threats (APTs). Highly targeted emails are first sent to harvest login
credentials for Microsoft Outlook accounts using dummy User Access Control prompts.
A compromised account of one employee, customer or partner is then used to send spear-
phishing emails to other company insiders. The attacker periodically injects a malicious
message containing previously exchanged Microsoft Office documents that embed hidden
malicious macros into an ongoing email discussion among multiple people (to improve
the exploit success factor). E-mails are sent from the accounts of people the target knows
adding to on going discussions already taking place. The attacker will blind carbon copy
(bcc) other recipients to further obfuscate the malicious e-mail [Arstechnica 2014].
MA1,
TD1,
MD1-R
DV3,
IM1
AP1,
ES2
Tabnabbing After a user unknowingly navigates to a malicious website, embedded mal-
ware on the latter detects when the page has lost its focus and attempts to deceive the
user into thinking they had left a Gmail (or other popular website) tab open. For this, the
attacker needs to display the Gmail favicon (short for ”favourite icon”) and a convincing
title, such as Gmail: Email from Google, as well as a spoofed Gmail login page by ad-
justing Javascript code within the website. The spoofed gmail login page is used to steal
the login credentials before redirecting the user to the real Gmail website. As it is most
likely that the user had never really logged out of Gmail, the direction makes it appear
as if the login were successful and, thus not suspicious [Raskin 2011].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV1,
IM2
AP1,
ES1
Typosquatting (also known as Cybersquatting): User mistypes a domain name (e.g,
”twiter.com” instead of ”twitter.com”) into a browser and lands on a phishing website,
which has copied the appearance of the legitimate, intended website. Typically the web-
site appears identical, but does not have the same functionality. An example would be a
social media website with a login prompt. Once the user enters their login details into
the phishing website, they are redirected to the legitimate website after their personal
data have been stolen [Szurdi et al. 2014; Agten et al. 2015].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV1,
IM1
AP1,
ES2
Visual SSL Spoofing: In SSL spoofing, the attacker configures a website to imitate spe-
cific parts of the browser interface, which a user would expect to display SSL/TLS connec-
tivity status. By using official-looking logos or address bars with the typical padlock icon
demonstrating encrypted communication, users can be fooled into believing they are on
a secure website and entering sensitive information which the user will steal [Adelsbach
et al. 2005].
MA2,
TD2,
MD1-R
DV1,
IM1
AP1,
ES1
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Watering hole: A highly targeted version of the drive-by-download attack, whereby an
attacker embeds malware on websites that are visited by a specific individual or group
of people. Eventually, the user/group will be exposed to the exploitation in one of the
websites they regularly visit and trust. Here, the attacker is persistent in the attempt
to exploit the chosen individual/group by infecting multiple websites they are known to
visit [RSA 2012].
MA2,
TD1,
MD1-R
DV3,
IM2
AP1,
ES1
WiFi Evil Twin: Similar to a rogue access point, on top of the rogue AP the attacker
spoofs a nearby SSID of another WiFi service whilst also programmatically duplicating
any web-captive portal (typically an authentication page) that exists on the legitimate
access point in the environment. Once a user connects to the spoofed access point, the
attacker intercepts all traffic, syphoning off credentials, files and sensitive information
[Song et al. 2010; Felt and Wagner 2011; Phifer 2000; Briones et al. 2013]. An advanced
version of this attack uses the snoopy platform that can be embedded within a UAV drone
[SensePost 2014].
MA1,
TD2,
MD3
DV3,
IM2
AP2,
ES2
Table II: Taxonomic Classification of Semantic Attacks
Fig. 6. Taxonomic statistics of Table II
The taxonomic classification of Table II can help identify the characteristics that
are shared between different attacks (Figure 6). For example, it is evident that in
terms of orchestration most attacks exhibit promiscuous targeting (TD2), software-
based remote distribution (MD1-R) and automation (MA2). A defence approach that
would thwart this orchestration pattern would be applicable to almost half of the se-
mantic attack types listed here. In terms of exploitation, the vast majority rely on
cosmetic deception alone (DV1) or in combination with behavioural deception (DV3).
Approaches that would detect or prevent mismatches between the appearance and
function of GUI components on websites and applications would reduce considerably
the semantic attack surface.
The classification also shows the greatest strength of semantic attacks. Most require
no more that one deception step (ES1), which means that a single error in judgement
on behalf of the targeted user is sufficient. This is exemplified by spear-phishing at-
tacks used to gain a foothold in target systems with otherwise strong technical security
measures, from financial institutions and nuclear facilities [Loukas 2015], to the com-
puters of high-value individuals. Even a prominent cryptographer with several com-
puter security patents in his name can be deceived into clicking the “accept” button on
a spoofed LinkedIn invitation from a non-existent employee of the European Patent
Office [Eeckhaut and Vanhecke 2014].
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3. SURVEY OF SEMANTIC ATTACK DEFENCE MECHANISMS
The impulsive and unpredictable behaviour of human users has been widely charac-
terised as one of the most significant weaknesses in modern computer systems [Hasan
and Prajapati 2009]. While security controls against technical exploitations have im-
proved considerably in recent years, the same successes have proven difficult to repli-
cate in user security.
Training and experience can certainly help but are neither easy to acquire nor suf-
ficient [Mitnick and Simon 2001; Hinson 2008]. The landscape of semantic attacks is
wide and continuously expanding. While user targeting has been historically limited
to emails and websites, the advent of the Internet of Things [Hasan and Prajapati
2009] is expanding the scope of exploitations to even include smart home appliances
[Kuipers et al. 2010]. Current systems have limited capability to compare a spoofed
file icon with the associated extension or to efficiently highlight the execution sim-
ilarities of different file extensions to users in a pro-active fashion. Similarly, users
rarely inspect their computer environment before performing actions that may com-
promise their system [Jordan and Heather 2005; Dhamija et al. 2006; Abraham and
UnduShobha 2010]. The following survey describes an overview of mechanisms that
can protect users against semantic attacks.
3.1. Organisational
3.1.1. Policy and Process Control. Policy and process provide hierarchical control
through management frameworks as opposed to technical systems. Designed at low-
ering exposure to semantic attacks, well maintained policy and organisational proce-
dures help to mitigate and significantly lower the risk of a potential exploit occurring,
without relying on the technical capabilities of users [Mitnick and Simon 2001; Hinson
2008; Colwill 2009].
Policy and process control is defined around the business and user environment, as
appropriate to their specific needs, for organisational and personal use. However, secu-
rity frameworks introduced to address semantic attacks have been added as bolt-ons
to the wider technical threat, rather than embedded into the governance and strate-
gic development of policy and process control. Mitnick and Simon [2001] reiterates
this approach as a major vulnerability, insisting policy should be intrinsically built
with people management and therefore embedded in the core of any information secu-
rity framework. The prevalence of semantic attacks has resulted in a higher degree of
applicability within policies that are integrated in internationally standardised frame-
works ([Calder and Watkins 2010; Calder and Watkins ; Ali 2014]). Dedicated Govern-
mental Guidelines have also been proposed in ([GOVUK 2015; CPNI 2013; Calder and
Watkins 2014; Jansen and Grance 2011]) as well as detailed methodologies and inves-
tigations in guide books and research ([Peltier 2013; Frauenstein and Solms 2013]).
The book published by Peltier [2013] offers a comprehensive collation of strategies
for implementing secure policy and process for IT governance; combining standards
and best practice guidelines for integrating information security across organisational
domains i.e. user roles and responsibilities to embedded data security tools. Frauen-
stein and Solms [2013] have developed a user centric, holistic framework specifically
targeting phishing attacks. The framework includes a user, ”Human Firewall”, layer
in the information security framework, enabling cross communication between defence
dimensions (the user, organisational policy and technical controls) by combining mech-
anisms such as user awareness and training with policy and linked technology tools.
Current frameworks focus on preemption through layered control mechanisms, as
opposed to being proactive and dynamic to change. Policy and Procedures need to be
flexible to unknown and unforeseen attacks and therefore appropriate to the chang-
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ing threat landscape. Fixed guidelines can quickly become out-of-date as new attack
methods are constantly being developed. Furthermore, as a personal tool, policy and
procedure can be ineffectual. Rules and regulations designed to enforce and maintain
security are too large in scope, almost entirely irrelevant to the personal user and their
specific use of computer systems and the internet.
3.1.2. Awareness Training. As user deception is the primary attack vector, susceptibility
to semantic attacks can be somewhat reduced with user awareness training. Educa-
tion is a core component of the defence-in-depth model and in the instance of semantic
attacks relates to areas where technical security mechanisms have proven to be in-
adequate. Interactive training maximises learning and awareness, such as bite-size
quizzes, tests or games [Kumaraguru 2009; Cone et al. 2007; Arachchilage et al. 2012;
Sheng et al. 2007], which when applied periodically provide education on the charac-
teristics of different attack types. A large proportion of research into awareness train-
ing has focused on the approach of content, the methodology of its delivery and how
data gathered from testing and formal application can be used to shape security policy
and user training programmes [Kruger and Wayne 2006; Kirlappos and Sasse 2012].
Miller and Garfinkel [2006], Schechter et al. [2007] and more recently Lin et al. [2011]
have conducted research to measure the effectiveness of awareness systems built into
browser security systems, including security toolbars, domain highlighting for sus-
pected phishing and HTTPS/SSL/TLS connection indicators. Their results showed that
none of these methods were effective because users would not understand or pay atten-
tion to warnings. Similarly, the more recent work of Lee et al. [2015] has shown that
security images meant to provide visual confirmation of website authenticity in Inter-
net banking have also proven unreliable, as 74% of the study’s participants entered
their password after the security images were removed.
An analysis of user awareness indicators in a role-playing survey carried out in
[Sheng et al. 2010] demonstrated that the attitude of users against phishing attacks
correlated highly with certain demographic characteristics. For example, the age group
18 to 25 was shown to be more susceptible to phishing than other age groups. Further-
more, once educational material was provided against a demographic, users were 40%
less likely to enter information into an attack website. Interestingly, this was shown to
be counter-productive in a few instances where users avoided legitimate websites too.
A study carried out in [Doupe et al. 2011] suggested using the familiar concept of
live “capture the flag” competitions also for measuring and teaching “cyber situational
awareness” to users faced with security threats, including semantic attacks. Their com-
petition involved 900 students spread across 16 countries. While undoubtedly inter-
esting and useful, there was no mechanism for measuring which of the students’ skills
and to what extent were improved by participating in the competition.
Other research has approached awareness training by exploiting the interactivity
observed in gaming and its educational impact and value, with development and in-
tegration of technology trends such as Social Networking. In [W. A. Labuschagne and
Eloff 2011] and [Gulenko 2013] Social Networking Sites are used as a platform to both
delivery awareness applications to maximise exposure, exploitable functionality such
as automated propagation through friend activity notifications and viral trends. Fur-
thermore SNS were able to provide the means to measure effectiveness of applications
in a social media environment by monitoring the response of subsequent user activity
such as public/private access to profiles. Other developments have taken awareness
efforts further through web-based/portal training systems, even by introducing proxy
based training such as ”awareness middleware” for access to the internet [Kritzinger
and von Solms 2010]. The middleware in this sense is a proxy training portal, re-
sponsible for brokering a connection between the user and internet access. Only after
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users successfully complete a training quiz/test for improving security education and
risk awareness will access to remote resources is permitted. Stewart et al. [2009] and
more recently Konak and Bartolacci [2012] have developed training platforms to create
awareness and better understanding of the dynamics of semantic threats, by utilising
virtualisation as a collaborative and interactive training platform.
A study conducted by Anderson et al. [2013] has used neurological scanning to deter-
mine how “habitation” (an automated response based on a reoccurring theme) occurs
when users are presented with common, static security warnings, such as HTTPS cer-
tificate warnings. The research analyses brain behaviour through functional magnetic
resonance imaging, where users were shown to exhibit a drop in visual processing sec-
tions of the brain after multiple exposures to a similar security warning. As a solution,
the researchers suggested security warnings that are polymorphic, constantly chang-
ing appearance and behaviour each time they are generated (e.g., different colour, text,
location, size, etc.). This was shown to reduce automatic responses and influence higher
cognitive responses.
A recent study by Neupane et al. [2014] identified the neurological indicators asso-
ciated with user response when exposed to semantic attacks. They showed that users
exhibit notable brain activity associated to decision-making, problem solving, atten-
tion and comprehension, when security scenarios arise. The study was able to show
how individual personality traits can influence decision making results, which can be
used to improve training and awareness programmes. For example, training users to
respond assertively to malware warnings may prove ineffectual outside a controlled
environment for users that exhibit highly impulsive behaviour.
Novel suggestions for creation of a user risk-detection tools [Schaff et al. 2013; Guil-
laume et al. 2014], can be used to build and define user awareness and develop train-
ing policies. The experiment conducted in [Bakhshi et al. 2009] has demonstrated how
participating organisations can identify the level of user security awareness, through
targeted phishing attacks. Whilst this type of experiments can yield very useful re-
sults, they can also be disruptive to an organisation’s daily work and may have to be
abandoned early (as was the case in the particular study). Furthermore, results need
to be followed up through continually improved awareness programs and efficient user
risk measurement. These tasks are manually intensive and their long term benefit
may not be obvious to organisations. Awareness training approaches certainly have
an impact, but the extent of this impact is uncertain, as there is no reliable approach
for measuring the lasting effect. Primary evaluation is traditionally based on super-
vised testing in specific case studies [Eminagaoglu et al. 2009; McCrohan et al. 2010].
The extent to which different awareness training strategies employed by organisations
impacts their quarterly or yearly breach statistics is not measured.
3.2. Technical
3.2.1. Sandboxing Mechanisms. Sandboxing is the process of creating an isolated com-
puter environment, typically through virtualisation, to test untrusted operations such
as those observed in unverified and untested code or programs. It has been effectively
implemented as a security solution in various fields of computing, from specific code
platforms [Leroy 2001] to browser systems [Barth et al. 2008], and in the field of smart-
phone security to improve defence against malicious software [Blasing et al. 2010].
Proprietary applications, such as Adobe Acrobat X, have also implemented their own
sandbox engine for enhanced security [Xiao and Zhao 2013].
A sandboxing environment can check and analyse characteristics associated with an
attack by categorising behaviour for anomaly detection [Greamo and A.Ghosh 2011].
Further sandboxing methodologies can provide an assured integrity checking mecha-
nism [Peterson et al. 2002; Brickell et al. 2011]; this approach relies heavily on the
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accuracy of behavioural analysis algorithms for detection and introduces the issue
of increased resource demand. In the context of semantic attacks, sandboxing offers
limited control, especially as it handles the execution of code, rather than. A techni-
cal attack using visual deception methods instead of technical mechanics to deceive
users would need to be understood by the sandbox, but this is a very complex task re-
quiring sampling of graphical interpretation. Web browsers [Chromium 2015; Firefox
2015] have implemented sandbox technologies to prevent websites from manipulating
the browsers’ own visual and behavioural properties, such as the URL address bar,
browser tabs and security indicators. However, these mechanisms are still unable to
prevent the execution of spoofing attacks, such as those creating a fake address bar
[Drake et al. 2004; Comodo 2015] using code that appears legitimate to the sandbox,
but is visually deceiving the user. Instead, the limited research conducted in the ap-
plication of sandboxing for semantic attacks focuses on its value as a learning tool.
Romney et al. [2005] utilised a sandbox environment to gather data used in enhancing
user security training.
The Windows and Linux operating systems implement a number of sandbox mecha-
nisms to prevent unauthorised changes being made to a system; acting as a good line of
defence even when a user may have unknowingly been deceived by a semantic attack.
One such example is the secure-attention-sequence or secure-attention-key as it is bet-
ter known, which is a secure method of preventing applications spoofing an operating
system login process. The login system is sandboxed from potential threats by using
the operating system kernel to suspend all running processes before it is initiated. The
user access control (UAC) system is another Windows sandbox mechanism that uses
the user interface privilege isolation (UIPI) to prevent applications from unauthorised
privilege escalation during execution. This is achieved by isolating processes marked
with a lower integrity level (e.g. unsigned, untrusted third party application) from
sending messages to higher integrity level processes (e.g. to request an action that
might require root system access), until granted by an authorised user in the UAC
prompt or valid certificate from an approved code-signing authority [Microsoft 2007].
This approach can certainly limit the impact of some semantic attacks, but is specific
to the operating system and cannot observe requests made to a remote system that it
has no control over.
A system titled “BLADE” (block all drive-by exploits) developed by Lu et al.
[2010], provides a sandboxing mechanism to mitigate drive-by download exploitations.
BLADE introduces a browser-independent operating system kernel extension, which
enforces the rule that executable files must originate from an explicit user action pro-
viding consent. In the case of a drive-by download, where there is normally no explicit
user action involved, the system redirects to a secure sandboxed location on the user
system disk where execution is prevented. This approach is agnostic of the mechanism
for deception or obfuscation and whether it is a zero days threat, as it responds only
when a download occurs without specific user consent. In testing, BLADE was able
to block all drive-by download attacks against a sample of over 1900 active malicious
URLs with a minimal effect on system performance.
Invincea [2014] and Pro [2014] offer commercial sandboxing environments that in-
tegrate into existing operating systems. These applications install an abstraction layer
for handling the execution of programs and files (user initiated or otherwise). Whilst
not exclusively aimed at providing protection against semantic attacks, they offer a
last line of defence where a malicious application may have found its way on a user
system. Requests made by all executing programs are analysed in real-time and cate-
gorised as either a threat or legitimate, and are then handled appropriately.
The open source project “Qubes OS” [OS 2015] has developed an operating sys-
tem that utilises sandboxing to logically separate different applications on a system
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from infecting another, should one particular element become compromised. This is
achieved by separating different applications into virtual machines that are isolated
by security domain, e.g. work/personal. The system also integrates graphical prop-
erties, such red app window frames for untrusted and green for trusted, to visually
identify applications in different sandboxes. Whilst this functionality does not neces-
sarily block a semantic attack from occurring in the sandbox itself, it can help inform
users whether they should trust the behaviour or appearance of application based on
the specific sandbox’s security domain.
Recently, Bianchi et al. [2015] have developed a tool for the android operating sys-
tem designed to prevent malicious apps executing cosmetic (DV1), behavioural (DV2)
or both cosmetic and behavioural deception (DV3). This can include spoofing an ap-
plications appearance or generating misleading visual cues on top of legitimate ap-
plications by capturing and analysing application programme interface (API) calls to
the android graphical user interface. The researchers employ a method call “static code
analysis which interrogates application bytecode, based on a system proposed by Egele
et al. [2013], during run-time to scan for requests made to specific Android API’s which
can enable the execution of visually deceptive components into an android systems
graphical interface. The method can be applied for both preemptive and proactive pro-
tection of the android interface by vetting applications before release or by detecting
this behaviour on the host device during operation. Whilst the approach was shown to
be successful at identifying applications that use these APIs to execute cosmetic decep-
tion, the researchers also found that there was a significant rate of false positives. In
response, they supplement the sandbox mechanism with a visual reputation system to
confirm the identity of applications which use these APIs legitimately and those that
do not. Crucially, in an evaluation involving 308 users, this approach was shown to
significantly improve a users ability to detect malicious applications.
3.2.2. Authorisation, Authentication and Accounting (AAA). Authentication, authorization,
and accounting (AAA) is a framework for intelligently controlling access to computer
resources, enforcing policies, auditing usage, and providing the information necessary
to bill for services. It is usually implemented in controlled environments, especially
where there is a varied user landscape posing a risk to the control and protection of
data. The framework provides controls for access to resources (Authentication), organ-
isational policy enforcement (Authorisation) and auditing of resource usage i.e. login
times, session length, devices accessed (Accounting). Its use aims to ensure that organ-
isations have a detailed level of assurance and control over who has access to a system,
based on data on names, roles, skill sets etc. In large deployments, such as organisation
domains and networks, AAA can be effectively managed through supervision, ensur-
ing extended identification and delegated access is in place to run executables, access
shared folders etc. However, in a home user environment, AAA is less practical because
the central supervising authority remains with the user [Motiee et al. 2010]. The capa-
bilities of the individual require correct usage of ”least user rights” and administrator
privileges where appropriate to protect the system and secure data.
Many technical, autonomous, session based protocols such as Kerberos [Neuman
and Ts’o 1994] have been successfully combined with secure centralised authentica-
tion and authorisation platforms [Desmond et al. 2008]. Such solutions have proven
effective at managing AAA assurances, but governing configuration rules are statically
implemented and lack interactivity and dynamic visual interfacing with users once ac-
cess to a system has been established. On the other hand, security platforms such as
Microsoft’s User Access Control not only indicate to users that an action may require
more privileged rights but it actually displays when a program is trying to gain these
rights to run and it asks the users to identify themselves beforehand [Motiee et al.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0, Publication date: 2015.
0:24 R. Heartfield and G. Loukas
2010]. One can then make an informed decision. However, the system still relies on
the user’s due diligence in correctly selecting use access control options. Advancement
in identity management, such as Microsoft’s Forefront Identity Manager [Turner et al.
2010], have developed comprehensive AAA security that has a wide range of applica-
tion effect at preventing semantic attacks. Yet, although they provide flexible control
over users and access to resources, Identity management systems are not dynamic in
their mitigation mechanisms. With regards to the growing threat of SNS-based seman-
tic attacks, Boshmaf et al. [2012] have identified a range of AAA flavoured mechanisms
that can provide some protection against automated sybil attacks [Huber et al. 2010]
and other current threats. Portable identities, with mutual verification and authen-
tication between open systems (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn), limit the ability to
abuse SNS functionality. This is suggested as the main challenge to address as it main-
tains usability without introducing difficult to use, user facing security controls. This
area still lacks working examples and complex semantic attack SNS exploitations re-
main a major problem. For AAA frameworks to be able to address semantic attacks
effectively, there needs to be a shift towards more pro-active measures, rather than
relying almost entirely on sound management and individual user security awareness
against system generated warnings.
3.2.3. Monitoring. In this context, by monitoring we refer specifically to the observation
of computer system behaviour, generated by user/programmable actions, via collection,
aggregation and analysis mechanisms. Monitoring is a key security mechanism for se-
mantic attacks as new exploitations can be classified through exposure and effective
security controls introduced through understanding of compromising user actions. His-
toric monitoring has required heavy supervision and forensic investigation, whereas
new developments allow semantic attacks to be identified and addressed through use
of Honeypots [Lee et al. 2010]. These virtualised environments allow security practi-
tioners to analyse exploitations, classify attack characteristics and identify the user
behaviour that can lead to compromise. Research conducted in statistical monitoring
focuses on developing semantic attack masquerade aversion by modelling user search
behaviour. For example, Salem and Stolfo [2011] have introduced a novel method of
monitoring and machine learning in order to identify anomalous user behaviour on a
given system. The work conducted by Ruskov et al. [2014] proposes adding dynamic
adaptation to crime scripts (a sequence of actions observed in a semantic attack), which
can model user/attacker behaviour in a given scenario and can be used in simulation,
monitoring data output for collation in order to simplify the process of enumerating at-
tack procedures. A promising piece of recent research in this area by Stringhini et al.
[2013] has developed malicious website detection by monitoring the redirection path
taken to reach a web destination, instead of analysing physical website features.
Lu et al. [2011] have introduced “SURF”, a browser extension designed to detect
search engine poisoning by monitoring “search-then-visits” user sessions and classify-
ing redirections into legitimate or malicious. The particular system was able to achieve
99% accuracy in the researchers’ empirical real-world evaluation.
Li et al. [2013] have topologically mapped dedicated hosts on malicious web in-
frastructures, involved in orchestrating redirection paths to malicious websites. The
research used a PageRank algorithm to monitor and capture attack hosts responsi-
ble for traffic brokering and exchange for malicious activities. This study focuses on
the management overlay that cybercriminals implement to conduct and control large-
scale malware distribution. As part of the study to identify redirection chains, the
researchers used a system called “WarningBird” [Lee and Kim 2012], which is a URL
detection system for Twitter, designed to protect against conditional redirection, where
the attacker redirects web crawlers to a legitimate landing site, but a user to the at-
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tack location. In combination with a real-time classifier, WarningBird exhibits a high
degree of accuracy against large samples of Tweets.
3.2.4. Integrity checking. User and application/data integrity is difficult to assure with-
out proof or analysis, especially if the data and subsequent behaviour characteristics
originate from an external network, colleague or friend. Integrity checking provides
the user with a visual response and technical assurance as to whether the file, web-
site, or data should be trusted [FirstCyberSecurity 2009; Webroot 2013]. Systems such
as TripWire implement File Integrity Monitoring that continuously monitors the in-
tegrity of a data e.g. a file a based on its properties and behaviour, and further work
has shown how this defense mechanism can become dynamic [Abdullah et al. 2011]. A
study carried out by Dhanalakshmi and Chellappan [2010] evaluates methods for file
type classification, for the purposes of identifying and detection file masquerading at-
tacks. The research evaluates file type detection algorithms such as FHT (File header
and trailer), MDA (Multi-Discriminant analysis) and CFD (Compound file detection)
in order to identify the true file type. Using this approach the researchers are able to
classify fragments of a file, or embedded files to determine a file type; thus providing a
key mitigation mechanism for common file masquerading attacks. Research conducted
in [Hara et al. 2009] shows how using simple methods to determine integrity, by check-
ing and comparing visual similarity-bsaed phishing can provide accurate and effective
results. The researchers demonstrate that by analysing the similarity between visual
components in a website, without prior knowledge that it is an attack platform, they
are able to automatically determine specific templating of websites that have been
spoofed by a large degree of phishes sites.
Recent studies have proposed solutions for detecting the integrity of URLs [Bhard-
waj et al. 2014] through optimisations algorithms and image detection techniques to
mitigate rogueware [Seifert et al. ; Dietrich 2013]. Integrity tools have also been de-
veloped to provide protection against WiFi ”Evil Twin” access points, by analysing key
components related to the appearance SSID-mac address mappings as well as hashing
and cryptographic algorithms being used [Darknet 2015]. Future research addressing
semantic attacks can consider digital signatures or certificates that originate from a
central authentication system to prove legitimacy of data presented in a file or appli-
cation (website, email, utility programs), where the data is uploaded, analysed and
approved, so that where data are missing from this central authority or using un-
known certificates, there is reduced functionality until it is properly verified for secure
operation in its respective environment (domain, shared platform - desktop, folder,
cloud storage). In social media platforms have been plagued ”Sybil” attacks (where a
reputation system is subverted by creating multiple fake identifies in a P2P network
e.g. Social Network Site), Alvisi et al. [2013] document and evaluate the evolution of
defences that have been developed to mitigate this growing threat. The study shows
trends in defence mechanisms, that are quickly becoming mathematically complex in
nature and sometimes proven to be ineffectual in practice e.g. when applied against
a real-world primitive attack. The researchers suggest a defense in depth approach is
necessary, such as implementing region-based community detection and social graph
topologies to identify sybil attacks where sybil regions (forged identities/communities)
are connected to honest nodes (legitimate user profiles). They also indicate that social
network operators should implement machine learning algorithms, user profiling tools
and user activity monitoring in combination to help identify attacks.
3.2.5. Machine Learning. Research has demonstrated how malware detection through
machine learning can be dynamic, where suitable algorithms such as k-nearest neigh-
bours, decision tree learning, support vector machines, bayesian and neural networks,
can be applied to profile files against known and potential exploitations and distin-
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guish between legitimate and illegitimate data [Chandrasekaran and Upadhyaya
2006; Singhal and Raul 2012; Gavrilut et al. 2009]. Machine learning algorithms have
been successfully applied to detect malicious emails, using anomaly classification tech-
niques that demonstrate the potential and capability for further application in other
related semantic attack areas [Dong-Her et al. 2011]. Research conducted to tackle the
threats of social engineering specifically has seen the employment of neural networks
to predict the legitimacy/illegitimacy of phone calls. Using a fabricated dataset, the ap-
proach showed positive accuracy in prediction responses, and as such the classification
methodology may be suitable across a wider range of semantic attack types. However,
dependable datasets generated from real-world data may be essential, as well as the
ability to formally integrate algorithm decision processes into suitable access-control
systems [Sandouka et al. 2009]. An effort to build credible classifiers for teaching ma-
chine learning algorithms has been proposed in [Lee et al. 2010], where bespoke hon-
eypots provide features that can indicate and help filter out social network spammers.
The application of machine learning for defence against semantic attacks can be
traced back to the training of support vector machines using binary features for detect-
ing early spam emails [Drucker et al. 1999]. A significant amount of research utilising
machine learning algorithms has focused on building efficient detection mechanisms
for web and email phishing attacks, with work by Fette et al. [2007] and Basnet et al.
[2008] testing a range of clustering and filtering techniques to classify data for accu-
rate prediction of attack detection. Similarly, the research conducted by Garera et al.
[2007] highlights the difference between legitimate and illegitimate URLS and pro-
poses a regression filter for constructing classifiers specifically for URL phishing. In
a related piece of work, [Bergholz et al. 2008] developed a system to detect phishing
emails based on the component features of the email, such as body of text, sender ad-
dress or embedded images, using combinations of machine learning for classification
and class modelling mechanisms for filtering. Bergholz et al. [2010] have continued
this research by demonstrating the effectiveness and functionality of a range of filter-
ing approaches that, if combined, can provide effective detection for this attack vector.
Advancements in the application of Ontological Semantics Technology have seen
developments that demonstrate applicability semantic attacks too, employing an arti-
ficial intelligence approach with an expression based dataset as the prediction mecha-
nisms for building inferences about textual data [Raskin et al. 2010]. This type of de-
tection mechanism indicates useful application against phishing attacks observed in
emails and websites. Whilst this technology is not strictly classified as machine learn-
ing in regards to the algorithms that are used, there is a learning process coordinating
decisions on a piece of data, in this case text-based language, to make predictive infer-
ences about malicious or non-malicious communication. More recent research by Xiang
et al. [2011] has introduced CANTINA+, which is a framework for website phishing
detection using machine learning algorithms over a range of systems including search
engines and third party applications. This research brings together multiple systems,
such as search engines, third party services with machine learning mechanisms to
accurately classify web pages.
In [Cova et al. 2010], machine learning and emulation techniques have been used
to detect anamolous javascript behaviour against established behaviour profiles to
prevent drive by downloads. The researches apply 10 different features of an attack
process to categorise activities involved in drive-by downloads, emulating website be-
haviours that match these features in combination with an anamoly detection classi-
fier; implemented in a publicly available tool named JSAND. The researchers presents
results of JSAND’s application on a large-scale dataset of Javascript code. The study is
able to demonstrate through the use of an emulator, detection of malicious code when
compared with anamolous features built into a learned classifier (machine learning)
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model. Further research aims to build on the JSAND system to provide a browser ex-
tension that provides pro-active detecton and mitigation of drive-by download attacks.
Machine learning techniques have been applied to detect phishing attacks in Twit-
ter. In [Aggarwal et al. 2012], a URL phishing detector for Twitter focuses on tweet
content, length, hashtags, mentions, age of account, number of tweets combined with
URL features (shortened text, non standard domain prefix and suffix structure). Using
these variables within machine learning classification techniques (Naive Bayes, Deci-
sion Tree and Random Forest algorithms), detecting phishing techniques with an ac-
curacy of 92.52 %. The system has been developed for practical implementation, where
the researchers have deployed the system as a Chrome browser extension, working in
real-time to classify whether a tweet is a phishing attack or a legitimate communica-
tion from a twitter account. Furthermore, the study has been tested on a user com-
munity to evaluate its usability and practicality in application; with the researchers
claiming its relative simplicity and ease of use. The work represents research with a
product outcome that is usable to the internet community against a known vulner-
ability of a popular social media platform. Other URL detection mechanisms have
been demonstrated by Thomas et al. [2011], the study introduces a system that pro-
vides real-time URL spam filtering. The system proposed, Monarch, performs real-
time filtering of scam, phishing and malware URLs that are submitted to web services
through the use of linear classification with the combination of iterative parameter
mixing and subgradient L1-regularisation; calculating an overall accuracy of 91% and
0.87% false positive margin.
Stringhini and Thonnard [2015] have recently developed a system for classifying
and blocking spear phishing emails from compromised email accounts by training
a support vector machine based system with a behavioural model based on a user’s
email habits. The system collects and profiles behavioural features associated to writ-
ing (e.g., character/word frequency, punctuation, stylus), composition and sending (e.g.,
time/date, URL characterises, email chain content) and interaction (e.g., email con-
tacts). These features are used to create an email behaviour profile linked to the user,
which is continually updated whenever a user sends a new email. Testing showed that
the bigger the email history of a user the lower the rate of false positives, dropping
below 0.05% for 7000 emails and over.
Machine learning algorithms provide an architecture for profiling semantic attacks
in a pre-emptive fashion. By utilising characterisation variables with behavioural in-
put datasets (usually gathered via monitoring), precise predictions and indicators can
be established as to the significance of a file’s or a user’s behavioural effect on a sys-
tem. Whilst machine learning tools have been built, extensively tested and evaluated
in research, application has heavily focused on tackling phishing attacks, and most
specifically the cosmetic aspects (DV1), covering only a fraction of the wider semantic
attack problem space. There are not many actual implementations within deployed
and popular email services in the commercial space, and consequently there is a lack
of empirical evaluations in real user-facing environments.
4. ATTACK VS. DEFENCE MATRIX
The Attack Vs. Defence matrix shown in table III provides a comparative platform for
mapping current defence mechanisms to the taxonomic criteria of semantic attacks.
Its benefits are two-fold. It provides researchers with an indication of where the cur-
rent state of research stands (the majority view) and how to effectively categorise this
research (the taxonomy classification criteria). It also highlights attack vectors that
have seen underinvestment and may point towards areas where new research may
yield useful results, potentially achieving wider coverage by combining approaches
from multiple areas into a single, autonomous solution. For clarity we match each of
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the survey literature to classification criteria where it has had the most impact or for
which is directly or most relevant, and not criteria with an association by second or
third order of consequence.
We can observe that target description is the classification category that is one of
the least covered across the surveyed defence mechanisms. The usual approaches re-
late to policy and process, which are typical in the corporate arena, but somewhat
surprisingly, we have identified only three related technical approaches, none of which
in monitoring or integrity. This highlights an area where further research could be
beneficial. For example, semantic attacks that are automated (MA2), remotely dis-
tributed (MD1-R) and promiscuously targeted (TD2) would generate the same pattern
and possibly noticeable volumes of network traffic, which may be detectable by a net-
work monitoring system. Alternatively, an attack that is manual (MA1) and targeted
(TD1) may be more easily identified by an integrity mechanism, for example by au-
thenticating an addressable feature.
Another observation that can be made is that there are several areas that are not
adequately addressed by policy and process controls. Examples include the hardware
distribution techniques that feature no software interaction (MD2), as well as attacks
that persist and may target the user periodically (AP2). From the matrix, it is also
evident that awareness and machine learning have the widest and largely overlapping
coverage. Yet, we have not identified a single example of research where the two areas
have been combined, potentially by incorporating a machine learning component in an
awareness system, or by feeding awareness data for the training of a machine learning
system.
Interestingly, awareness efforts have primarily focused on exploitation factors, and
particularly in understanding the impact of education against the plethora of de-
ception vectors that are used in attacks. However, most have only addressed this
through scrutiny of user interfaces (IM1) and not of programmatic interface manip-
ulation (IM2), perhaps because awareness methodologies are typically designed for
non-technical audiences. Also interesting is the application of sandbox technologies.
They are highly appropriate for the software-based locally distributed (MD1-L), one-
off (ES1) attacks, which are generally difficult to defend against, but have seen a rel-
ative underinvestment in application against deception techniques (DV1-3). However,
as recent research has shown [Bianchi et al. 2015], sandboxing can be effective in
identifying semantic attacks that implement both behavioural and cosmetic deception.
Therefore, sandboxing mechanisms are likely to offer a viable focus of future research
against deception techniques.
A distinctive observation of the matrix relates to defences that incorporate aware-
ness, sandbox and machine learning techniques. In combination, these three defence
categories apply to almost all of the classification criteria. Note that we previously
demonstrated how research in each classification category will be to a large extent ap-
plicable across several attacks that share a characteristic. Therefore, it is conceivable
that a defence system combining these features would potentially provide protection
against a very wide range of semantic attacks. To the best of our knowledge, a de-
fence mechanism designed to mitigate a multitude of semantic attacks integrating all
of these features does not exist yet.
5. DISCUSSION: GRAND CHALLENGES IN SEMANTIC ATTACK RESEARCH
Semantic attack research is fundamentally multidisciplinary. Different aspects of it
may require an understanding of personality traits, human-computer interaction, com-
puter and network monitoring, malware dynamics, and access control. In this context,
we have identified the following grand challenges.
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Attack Vs.
Defence
Organisational Technical
Policy/Process Awareness Sandbox AAA Monitoring Integrity Machine Learning
O
rc
h
es
tr
a
ti
on
TD1 Mitnick2001,
Colwill2009,
CPNI2013, Hin-
son2008
Bakhshi2009 Ruskov2014 Raskin2010,
Stringhini2015
TD2 CPNI2013,
Sheng2010,
Hinson2008
Drucker1999
MD1-L CPNI2013,
GOVUK2015
Sandboxie2014,
BufferZonePro2014,
Peterson2002,
Blasing2010,
Greamo2011,
Xiao2013
Salem2011,
Ruskov2014
Singhal2012,
MD1-R CPNI2013,
GOVUK2015,
Frauen-
stein2013,
Janson2011
Labuschagne2011,
Sheng2010,
Arachilage2012
Lu2010, Barth2008,
Blasing2010
Boshmaf2012 Lee2012,
Stringhini2013,
Li2013,
Lu2011,
Ruskov2014
Webroot2013,
FCS2009,
Bhardwaj2014,
Dietrich2013
Stringhini2015,
Basnet2008,
Aggarwal2012,
Cova2010,
Xiang2011,
Bergholz2010,
Garera2007,
Fette2007,
Drucker1999,
Dong-Her2004,
Lee2010
MD2 Boileau2006, Du-
flot2011
MD3 GOVUK2015 EvilAP EvilAP
MA1 Mitnick2001,
Colwill2009
Salem2011
MA2 Lu2010 Schaff2013,
Boshmaf2012
Lee2012,
Li2013,
Lu2011,
Stringhini2013
Webroot2013 Aggarwal2012
E
x
p
lo
it
a
ti
on
DV1 Calder2010,
Sheng2010,
CPNI2013
Bakhshi2009,
Gulenko2013,
Labuschagne2011,
Kirlappos2012,
Arachilage2012,
Kumaraguru2007,
Kumaraguru2009,
Lin2011, Wu2006,
Lee2015,
Sheng2007
Bianchi2015 Lu2011,
EvilAP2015
Seirfert2013,
Webroot2013,
FCS2009,
Hara2009,
Dietrich2013,
EvilAP
Xiang2011,
Bergholz2010,
Bergholz2008,
Garera2007,
Basnet2008,
Fette2007, Lee2010
Dong-Her2004
DV2 CPNI2013 Gulenko2013,
Schechter2007,
Anderson2013,
Neupane2014
Bianchi2015 Salem2011 Alvisi2013 Singhal2012,
Thomas2011,
Cova2010,
Raskin2010,
Drucker1999,
Lee2010
DV3 Gulenko2013,
Lin2011, Lee2015,
Anderson2013,
Neupane2014,
Sheng2007,
Wu2006
Bianchi2015 Lee2010 FCS2009,
Bhardwaj2014,
Dietrich2013
Aggarwal2012,
Stringhini2015
IM1 Calder2010 Bakhshi2009,
Arachilage2012,
Kumaraguru2007,
Kumaraguru2009,
Konak2012
Salem2011,
Lee2010
FCS2009 Dong-Her2004,
Basnet2008,
Aggarwal2012,
Xiang2011,
Bergholz2010,
Garera2007,
Fette2007,
Drucker1999,
Lee2010
IM2 Konak2012 Sandboxie2014,
QubesOS2015,
Microsoft2007,
BufferZonePro2014,
Bianchi2015,
Barth2008
Lee2012,
Li2013,
Lu2011,
Stringhini2013
Abdullah2011,
Dhanalak-
shmi2010,
FCS2009,
Bhardwaj2014,
Dietrich2013,
EvilAP
Chandrasekaran2006,
Singhal2012,
Thomas2011,
Basnet2008,
Aggarwal2012,
Cova2010,
Xiang2011,
Bergholz2010, Gar-
era2007, Fette2007
E
x
ec
u
ti
on
AP1 Sandboxie2014,
BufferZonePro2014,
QubesOS2015, Blas-
ing2010, Xiao2013,
Barth2008, Lu2010
Neuman1994,
Desmond2008,
Motiee2010,
Turner2010
AP2 Sandboxie2014,
BufferZonePro2014,
QubesOS2015, Blas-
ing2010, Xiao2013,
Barth2008, Lu2010,
Bianchi2015
ES1 Sandboxie2014,
BufferZone-
Pro2014, Blas-
ing2010, Xiao2013,
Barth2008, Lu2010
Neuman1994,
Desmond2008,
Motiee2010,
Turner2010
Stringhini2015
ES2 Frauenstein2013 Neuman1994,
Desmond2008,
Turner2010
Table III: Attack Vs. Defence Matrix
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5.1. An authoritative semantic attack dataset
The lack of publicly available, up to date, relevant and reliable datasets is a pervasive
issue in computer security research. In semantic attacks, the human factor makes the
acquisition of datasets even more difficult. Researchers often conduct lab-based experi-
ments, which allow for a controlled environment where several socio-technical metrics
can be evaluated, but their realism is arguably limited. The alternative, which is to
run “social experiments” at the scale required for collecting usable data is problematic.
Even if the semantic attacks conducted are innocuous, their potential impact on the
users is poorly understood and difficult to monitor. Crucially, debriefing is ethically vi-
tal for any deception-based research, but conducting effective debriefing in large-scale
social experiments is not straightforward.
The problem is aggravated by the wide range and dynamic nature of deception mech-
anisms employed. By the time a research group studies a new attack, designs a large-
scale experiment, recruits participants, conducts it, analyses and publishes the results,
the particular attack may already be gradually abandoned in the wild in favour of
newer ones. We propose that this can be somewhat alleviated by focusing not directly
to specific attack types, but to the taxonomic characteristics shared between multiple
attacks. An authoritative dataset that would be useful in this manner does not exist.
5.2. Predicting susceptibility to semantic attacks in real-time
A challenge related to the acquisition of an authoritative dataset is the identification
of measurable semantic attack susceptibility indicators that are practically usable by
technical defence developers. For instance, an interesting real-world study by Halevi
et al. [2015] has identified conscientiousness as a personality trait that is highly cor-
related to a user’s susceptibility to spear-phishing attacks. This might be helpful to
social scientists and designers of awareness programs, but is of little use to a techni-
cal protection system’s developer, because conscientiousness cannot be measured by a
software system in real-time or automatically. What may be measurable, such as typ-
ing speed, time to click, typing errors, mouse movement, number of browser tabs open,
time logged in, may not necessarily be relevant. A significant challenge is to identify
automatically measurable features that do indeed correlate with susceptibility to se-
mantic attacks.
5.3. Patching the user
An important strength of technical security measures is the ability to stay up to date.
Following an antivirus update, which is automatically and rapidly delivered, a com-
puter is protected effectively against several new and evolving threats. There is no
equivalent concept for semantic attacks. A software application or embedded system
may have a serious security flaw, but after this is discovered, the vendor can issue a
patch that addresses it. Again, there is no equivalent concept for semantic attacks. The
user, which is the entity of the system that is targeted, may take months or years to
learn how to recognise and protect from new deception techniques.
The challenge here is to develop a mechanism by which a user’s vulnerability to a
new semantic attack vector can be reduced in a timely manner. This may involve el-
ements of both dynamic access control and training. For example, a corporate user’s
access rights that are not core to their job role may be modified dynamically accord-
ing to the indicators identified in Section 5.2. An access restriction may then be lifted
once the user successfully completes a brief e-learning module or a practical assess-
ment on the latest semantic attack methodologies. Of course, this highlights a further
challenge, which is how to measure the effectiveness of user training or indeed of any
measure designed to protect users and organisations from semantic attacks.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0, Publication date: 2015.
A Taxonomy of Attacks and a Survey of Defence Mechanisms for Semantic Social Engineering Attacks0:31
6. CONCLUSION
Technical countermeasures have traditionally struggled to address a good range of se-
mantic attack types, especially the new and more dynamic ones. There is little doubt
that policy control, user education through training and awareness campaigns, and
other user management countermeasures can be effective, but to what extent is dif-
ficult to tell without a formal framework. It would probably be beneficial to combine
technical and user management countermeasures into a single autonomous system,
where users are proactively profiled in terms of their susceptibility to specific attack
types and are allocated permissions accordingly and dynamically. Towards this vision,
it is important to have an overall view of the semantic attack threat landscape. The
taxonomy provided here is a step in tackling this challenge. It introduces a structured
baseline for classifying semantic attacks by breaking them down into their components
and thus allowing to identify countermeasures that are applicable to a range of differ-
ent attacks that share a subset of their characteristics. We have complemented this
taxonomy with a survey of defence measures, highlighting their suitability against the
taxonomy’s categories. In this manner, we aim to facilitate the design of more com-
prehensive defence mechanisms that can address each criterion of our classification
rather than specific attack families.
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